U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth speaks during the 23rd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue at the Shangri-La Hotel on May 30, 2026 in Singapore. Senior defence officials and military leaders from across the Asia-Pacific and beyond convene at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue, one of Asia’s premier track-one intergovernmental security forums.

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Gordon G. Chang

By Gordon G. Chang

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U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gave a largely boilerplate speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, East Asia’s premier national security conference, on May 30. Although there were good references to defense of the “First Island Chain,” he made no direct mentions of Taiwan, the center of that crucial line and the topic of the moment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Moreover, Hegseth did neither the region nor the free world any favors when, in conversation with reporters after his address, he said, referring to China, “We respect their ambitions.” China’s ambitions, unfortunately, include annexing neighbors in whole or in part and closing off international water and airspace.

Hegseth’s less-than-inspiring sentiments were, of course, in line with President Donald Trump’s disappointing comments about Taiwan—spoken to Bret Baier of Fox News and to reporters on Air Force One—after his summit with China's President Xi Jinping in Beijing last month. Trump, by adopting Xi’s distorted framing of the Taiwan issue and by calling the island republic a “very good negotiating chip,” undermined American credibility and therefore stability in the region.

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U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth speaks at the 23rd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue on May 30, 2026, at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore.

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China, pressing the advantage, immediately followed the summit with two “joint combat readiness patrols” close to Taiwan and aggressive patrolling near Scarborough Shoal. Beijing maintains a baseless sovereignty claim to the South China Sea feature but has engaged in forceful tactics to seize the shoal from the Philippines.

American presidents have yet to find their voice when it comes to China, and the region is increasingly concerned about Chinese aggression. After the U.S. secretary of defense's address, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, in a first, asked Hegseth in open session a question—whether the U.S. commitment to the region was “unwavering.”

Lance Gatling of Tokyo-based Nexial Research told Newsweek that Koizumi’s question “shows a new, public relations and social media savvy side to the younger, conservative and confident national security faction in the Liberal Democratic Party and Japanese bureaucracy.” Moreover, the novel move, Gatling believes, “reveals a sensitivity to and awareness of other potential Asian security partners.” The message, he says, is “the new Japan is on your side too and can get answers from America, even when you cannot.”

Japan is a bright spot, the center of a visible movement in the region of America and partners working far more closely together. There is, for instance, the Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation on weapons production; the AUKUS submarine partnership of Australia, U.K. and U.S.; the Quad of Australia, Japan, U.S. and India; and two new informal groupings, JAROKUS, which includes Japan, the Republic of Korea and the U.S., and JAROPUS, with Japan, the Republic of the Philippines and the U.S.

Hegseth’s Pentagon is also bringing in new security partners, most notably Indonesia, with its April 13 signing of the Major Defense Cooperation Partnership agreement, which the Pentagon stated will serve “as a guiding framework to advance bilateral defense cooperation.” Indonesia, the world’s largest archipelagic state, is a crucial partner: The Indonesian island of Sumatra forms the southern side of the Malacca Strait. Last year, more than 102,500 vessels passed through the waterway, part of the shortest shipping route between East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

“Given the renewed importance of strategic sea line choke points, like the Strait of Malacca, this U.S.-Indonesia defense pact ensures the free flow of maritime traffic and provides protection against the predatory aspirations of the People’s Republic of China,” James Fanell of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, told this publication.

“Indonesia recognizes that the U.S. is a more reliable partner, which has no territorial claims, compared to the People’s Republic, which harbors ambitions to seize Indonesian waters,” Fanell, also a former director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said.

Taiwan is not yet part of the formal regional groupings, but countries recognize that its security is an integral element of their security. On November 7 of last year, for instance, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, in response to a question from an opposition lawmaker on the floor of the Diet, said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would constitute a “survival-threatening situation,” a reference to Japan’s 2015 security law. In substance, she was stating that Japan could mobilize its Self-Defense Forces.

China threw a fit at her words—Beijing’s consul general in Osaka threatened to behead the Japanese prime minister—but she stood her ground and won a historic majority for her governing coalition in February. Takaichi proved that smaller nations can stand up to a large and blustery China.

Koizumi elicited a reassuring response from Hegseth in Singapore, but America’s friends and partners need to hear strong words from Trump himself. At the moment, the whole region is on edge.

Gordon G. Chang is the author of Plan Red: China’s Project to Destroy America and The Coming Collapse of China. Follow him on X @GordonGChang.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

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