Portraits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lie on a US flag in flames during a parade marking al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day in Tehran on July 1, 2016. Tens of thousands joined pro-Palestinian rallies in Tehran, as the annual Quds Day protests take on broader meaning for a region mired in bitter disputes and war.

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Joseph Epstein

By Joseph Epstein

Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute

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"[Israelis] have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear." That wasn't an Iranian ayatollah, a Hamas spokesman, or even a Columbia University professor. It was Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, representing NATO’s second-largest military, speaking on Turkish television last week. Israel's foreign minister called it textbook incitement to genocide. In the same interview, Fidan said Ankara has "no problem with confrontation if it comes to that."

This is no longer rhetoric without consequence. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Turkish and Israeli forces have operated in close proximity in Syria—the two countries now effectively share a border there. In 2025, it was reported Turkish F-16s and Israeli aircraft came into direct contact in Syrian airspace during an Israeli strike, prompting urgent talks on a deconfliction mechanism, though Turkey denied this happened. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called Zionism an existential threat to Turkey and asserted that Israeli operations in Syria and Lebanon endanger his country. His interior minister said vowed last month that Turkey would one day retake Jerusalem.

President Donald Trump has largely waved off the danger, pointing to his personal rapport with Erdoğan. That rapport is real, and it may hold for now. But managing a collision course between two heavily armed U.S. partners through one man's relationships is not a policy. It is a wager that expires, at the latest, in January 2029.

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Portraits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lie on a U.S. flag in flames during a parade marking Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day in Tehran .

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The U.S. has two assets it isn't fully employing. The first is leverage over Ankara, and it has rarely been greater. Last week the administration notified Congress of a sale exceeding $700 million of General Electric F110 engines to power Turkey's indigenous KAAN fighter—engines without which the program's early production would stall. The notification was timed ahead of the NATO summit Erdoğan hosted in Ankara on July 7-8, and the administration is separately reviewing whether Turkey might return to the F-35 program from which it was expelled in 2019 over its purchase of Russia's S-400 air-defense system. Trump has promised to "do something that will make them very happy."

These are precisely the inducements Ankara wants most, and they should carry a condition: measurable de-escalation toward Israel. That means sustaining and deepening the military deconfliction channel in Syria, ending official calls for Israel's isolation or destruction, and refraining from military deployments—such as air-defense systems at bases in central Syria—that Jerusalem has identified as red lines. A NATO ally seeking American engines for its fighters should not simultaneously be threatening war with America's closest Middle East partner. Congress, which has 15 days to review the engine notification, is well positioned to say so.

The second asset is Azerbaijan. Baku is the rare capital trusted in both Ankara and Jerusalem. It is Israel's closest partner in the Muslim world—a major supplier of its oil and a major purchaser of its arms—while its bond with Turkey is summarized in the formula "one nation, two states." It has converted that position into results before.

President Ilham Aliyev has said Azerbaijan was the leading behind-the-scenes force in the 2022 Turkish-Israeli reconciliation that brought Israel's president to Ankara. When it was alleged the two militaries nearly collided in Syria last year, Baku hosted successive rounds of talks—Israel's delegation led by its national security adviser—that produced a working hotline between the two armed forces. Azerbaijan has since facilitated contacts between Israel and Syria's new government, extending a longstanding role as a discreet bridge between Jerusalem and the Muslim world.

A serious American effort would formalize this: U.S. weight behind Azerbaijani-hosted talks, with the aim of expanding the Syria hotline into a standing mechanism covering air operations, ground deployments and intelligence deconfliction. Washington should also complete unfinished business with Baku itself. Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which restricts U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan, is a Cold War relic that Trump waived in August 2025; repealing it outright, as legislation now before the House proposes, would anchor the partner this diplomacy requires.

Skeptics will object that Erdoğan's hostility is domestic theater and will pass with him. The record suggests otherwise. When Turkey severed roughly $9.5 billion in annual trade with Israel in May 2024, the trigger was not an Israeli operation but municipal-election losses that bled Erdoğan's party toward Islamist rivals. Yet the sentiment now runs far beyond his coalition.

Pew finds more than 97 percent of Turks view Israel unfavorably—the highest share of any country surveyed—and even the Republican People's Party, the secular custodian of Ataturk's legacy, attacks Erdoğan for insufficient toughness toward Israel. Hostility to the Jewish state has become cross-party populism. It will outlast the 72-year-old president, and hostility toward America's ally rarely stays confined to the ally.

None of this serves Turkish interests. Israel maintains no territorial claims on Turkey and seeks nothing beyond the buffer zone on its Syrian frontier. Confrontation would set Turkey on Iran's path of isolation and economic decay, and would hand Moscow and Tehran a strategic windfall. The alternative is available: Neither country wants a resurgent Iran, both value their American ties, and both armed the same side when Azerbaijan retook Karabakh in 2020.

Turkey matters too much to lose to a needless war. It is the only U.S. ally besides Israel capable of projecting power beyond its borders, and its geography anchors the Middle Corridor linking Europe to Asia around Russia and Iran. Trump holds the inducements; Baku holds the trust. Used together, and soon, they can keep two American partners from a war that would profit only their common enemies.

Joseph Epstein is director of the Turan Research Center and senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

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