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By Tom O'Connor
Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy
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A former U.S. diplomat involved in the last nuclear deal reached between Iran and major world powers has argued that the Islamic Republic was already undergoing a significant internal shift, although not in a manner likely to be beneficial to President Donald Trump's administration.
Speaking during a virtual briefing held by the Middle East Institute on Tuesday, Alan Eyre, a veteran foreign service officer who served on the negotiating team that resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement in 2015, argued that "regime change" had already begun in Iran in the wake of the 12-day war fought with Israel.
Yet he said that "regime change in the sense that people in the West think about it, which is an alternative form of government that's more pro-West," was "unlikely" to unfold.
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Rather than empowering Iran's reformist bloc, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, who renewed calls for diplomacy with the United States despite its unprecedented direct attack on Iranian nuclear facilities last month, Eyre stated that the recent conflict was "more likely making this regime more militaristic, more isolationist, emphasizing also the security aspect of it."
Asked by Newsweek if there was a way he felt the Trump administration might be able to take advantage of the situation to advance the diplomatic solution still sought by the White House, Eyre remained doubtful.
"The U.S., at its best, was not good at this sort of subtle manipulation of other polities that would derive some form of government that was pro-West or pro-U.S., and especially now with the current U.S. administration, we just don't have the expertise, or necessarily even the desire to engage in these sorts of intricacies," Eyre said. "Democracy these days is a very blunt tool that's rusting."
"First of all, I think the reformists are of minor importance in Iran, and even if they were stronger, I don't think the U.S. has the ability to interface with it in a way to strengthen [them], at least in a way that's practical," he said. "I mean, the U.S. has tremendous ability to positively affect change in Iran and to strengthen reformists by lifting sanctions on Iran. But that's not going to happen."
Newsweek reached out to the Iranian Mission to the United Nations and the U.S. State Department for comment.
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Changing Tides in Tehran
The U.S. has a troubled history of interference in Iranian politics in pursuit of Washington's interests. The CIA-backed coup that helped reinstall the pro-Western shah in 1953 was followed by the 1979 Islamic Revolution that ultimately ousted the monarchy and put in place the current theocracy.
Publicly, there has been little to suggest any new disruptions to Iran's ruling system taking place imminently. All major players, including military leaders from both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the conventional Iranian Army, as well as reformist politicians, continue to swear loyalty to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who assumed power in 1989 following the death of his predecessor, revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Calls for mass uprisings by both Israel and an array of Iranian dissident groups, mostly based abroad, have also thus far gone unrealized in the wake of the 12-day war.
Newsweek recently spoke with several analysts who have insider sources in Iran who identified a gradual shift in domestic power mechanisms that predated the current conflict and may be accelerated by it.
Among the most common views expressed by experts was that Khamenei's position appeared to be weakening. The 86-year-old cleric wields absolute authority in Iran, though the IRGC has steadily consolidated influence over key mechanisms of power, including the economy, throughout his 36-year rule.
As speculation mounts over his successor, set to be decided by the 88-member Assembly of Experts, many feel the next supreme leader will likely take a backseat to other forces. However, debate persists as to whether the potential shift would result in a more pragmatic path or even a harder-line direction for Tehran.
Eyre, for his part, viewed the IRGC as the most likely actor to capitalize on any scenario involving the succession of the supreme leader.
"That position is strong over long periods of time," Eyre said. "When Khamenei was originally picked, he had no power whatsoever functionally, but his power came from installing his people in key positions, in accessing revenue streams, and over time, building up a network of people beneath him who relied on him and whom he could rely on."
"Whomever replaces Khamenei will have to do that same thing," he added. "But in the short term, whoever it is will be very weak and will be bound to more or less follow what he perceives to be the Khamenei line, and that means, since power abhors a vacuum, that the institution of the IRGC...will play a dominant role."
If Khamenei's successor fails to establish sufficient authority, Eyre said that "the next supreme leader could, in fact, become a ceremonial, vestigial, performative position, with the real power being held by the IRGC."
A Tough Path to Talks
After launching a massive campaign of direct strikes last month, Israel targeted both facilities and personnel, killing scores of top IRGC commanders in particular. Iran retaliated with hundreds of missile and drone strikes against Israel, also targeting a U.S. base in Qatar after Trump ordered the first-ever direct strikes on Iran.
Both Iran and Israel declared victory following the June 24 ceasefire announced by Trump, putting an end to the most intensive battle between the two arch-foes to date.
Meanwhile, Trump, who abandoned the JCPOA during his first term in 2018, has continued to express his desire to resume negotiations toward striking a new nuclear deal with Iran. However, uncertainties surround the possibility of rekindling diplomacy, as the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied Trump's claim last week that Tehran had sent him a request to return to the table.
Since then, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that Tehran would be willing to re-enter nuclear talks, but only on the condition that the White House provide a guarantee that it would pursue no additional military action against Iran.
Pezeshkian's latest remarks on Tuesday appeared to emphasize Iran's openness to diplomacy, but neither Washington nor Tehran has confirmed any return to negotiations.
"I think Iran fears that when the U.S. says it wants to negotiate, it means that it wants to accept Iran's surrender, because one of the things that Israel has done is now normalize new red lines where [there would be] no domestic enrichment, no missile program, no support for proxies," Eyre said.
"So, the sort of terms that allow Iran to go forward that are inside the strategic air are much more punitive on Iran than they used to be, and I think much more punitive than Iran is willing to accept," he added. "So, while the U.S. is the final destination for Iranian diplomacy, I don't think they're upbeat at all."
Eyre argued that "the real question is: What is the U.S. vision for diplomacy with Iran? Is it essentially punitive and maximalist or is there going to be a good-faith effort, which there wasn't before the war, to see if they can find a modus vivendi that modifies not just Iran's capabilities but also its intentions, which is going to be hard."
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