The Paris Attacks Deal Europe's Open Borders a Deadly Blow

Police in Paris react to a suspicious vehicle November 15, days after a series of deadly attacks in the city. Pascal Rossignol/Reuters

This article first appeared on the Chatham House site.

I was living and working in Washington when Al-Qaeda carried out its terror attacks on September 11 2001. Apart from the shock, there was an overpowering determination in the aftermath to bring Al-Qaeda to account and to destroy it so it could never again mount such attacks.

After the horror in Paris on Friday night, will France and its EU partners follow a similar instinct and logic toward Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)?

If not, what are the alternatives?

As with 9/11, the November 13 attacks in Paris were of a scale and nature to appear to qualify as an act of war. President François Hollande explicitly stated this on Saturday, and so have several French newspapers—reflecting the numbers of casualties and the careful planning inside and outside France that the attacks apparently involved. In this context, any talk of halting French military strikes on ISIS in Syria as well as Iraq is politically untenable.

Given the debacle surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is easy to forget that there was broad public and political support in 2001 in Paris and London, as well as Washington, that the battle should be taken to Al-Qaeda in its base—Afghanistan—from which the attack had been mounted. NATO launched an Article V operation to help protect U.S. airspace, while European military forces supported the ensuing NATO-led military operation.

Allies will also now want to show solidarity with France, depending on its chosen course of action. Moreover, as with Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks, ISIS has a physical presence across Syria and Iraq that provides targets for military strikes.

But there are two key differences with the aftermath of 11/13 in Europe. First, French and European reactions will play out in a post-Iraq environment, in which the risks and limitations of military intervention have been made painfully apparent to publics and politicians alike.

Some will argue that continued or increased military intervention in the region will not only have little effect, but will prompt further attacks at home. The number of returning fighters means that ISIS has a much larger group of potential supporters in European societies than Al-Qaeda did with its small cells, which still planned and in some cases carried out devastating attacks.

This factor amplifies the potential risks to European governments of escalating their military intervention. At the very least, adopting a unified position for a more muscular response among European governments and across the Atlantic will be extremely difficult.

Second, these were classic terrorist attacks, killing civilians in soft targets that can never be fully protected. A key part of their design is to provoke a counter-reaction that divides European societies internally, as well as between each other, and helps recruit new adherents in Europe and beyond.

The choice of targets—symbols of European integration rather than state authority—was interesting in this regard. Some European governments, including France's, rejected declaring "war on terror" after 9/11. They are unlikely to change their minds now, as much for the practical reason that most terrorists come from within their societies, even if many have had their terrorist skills honed overseas.

But simply maintaining the current mix of European policies is not an option, either. The attacks come at a very dangerous moment for Europe. Angst, confusion and disagreement over how to handle the unprecedented wave of refugees and migrants are coming to a boil. Economic growth remains anaemic in many parts of Europe and unemployment is still high.

The attacks may strengthen the hand of populist parties that have benefited from these trends just as key elections loom across Europe, starting with regional elections in France in three weeks.

The Paris attacks are now a further challenge to the credibility of EU governments. Whereas the massacre at the offices of Charlie Hebdo in January rallied Europeans around the principle of free speech, people will now wonder whether governments have the capacity to defend them physically, as well as protect their way of life.

At a minimum, therefore, EU governments will come under enormous pressure to stem the inflow of refugees and immigrants from the Middle East and Africa.

Many of those arriving are escaping exactly the sort of violence seen on the streets of Paris on Friday night. However, unconfirmed reports that at least one of the terrorists entered Europe through Greece will play into popular fears that terrorists are entering Europe with this inflow.

The refugee crisis has severely undermined trust between publics and governments in many parts of Europe, and poses fundamental questions about identity and integration that will not be resolved in the short term. In this context, and under the shadow of possible further attacks, it is hard to see how signatories to the Schengen Agreement can retain open internal borders until they have greater confidence in their surveillance and intelligence-sharing and have established greater control over the EU's external borders.

EU governments will also have to redouble their efforts to find a resolution to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq which have given space for the rise of ISIS. This will require a more intelligent combination of military force and diplomatic initiative.

EU governments ignored warnings three years ago that letting the Syria crisis play itself out was replete with its own dangers. Now they will have to focus simultaneously on helping stabilize Libya, Yemen and other vulnerable states in the region and Sahel.

The Paris attacks are a terrible confirmation that Europe's geography leaves them no other option.

Robin Niblett is director of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The Paris Attacks Deal Europe's Open Borders a Deadly Blow | Opinion