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By Daniel R. DePetris
Fellow, Defense Priorities
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Ever since former dictator Bashar al-Assad was rushed out of Damascus as his hollowed-out dynastic regime collapsed in December 2024, Syria has existed somewhere between hope and anguish. On the one hand, the new Syrian government under the stewardship of Ahmed al-Sharaa, an Al-Qaeda commander in his past life, has done a fairly remarkable job reaching out to the West—first and foremost the United States—in the hope of attracting the foreign investment his country so desperately needs. Yet on the other, Syria is still a country in turmoil, with the periodic eruption of inter-communal violence leading to some doubts in Washington that Sharaa is up to the task of unifying Syria after early 14 years of civil war.
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Sharaa, however, took a big leap toward that goal over the weekend. Much like his rapid success against Assad’s forces more than a year ago, his troops managed to claim swaths of territory from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, a U.S.-supported militia that carved out a semi-autonomous fiefdom in northern and eastern Syria. The military pressure quickly pushed the SDF back from territory it captured immediately after Assad’s fall. Money-making assets like oil fields, dams and gas facilities previously under the SDF’s control were suddenly re-taken by Sharaa’s forces. Sensing that his forces were outmaneuvered, the SDF’s top general, Mazloum Abdi, had no choice but to sign a political agreement with Damascus that effectively folds the Kurdish-dominated government into the Syrian state.
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The relationship between Sharaa and the SDF has been on the brink from the moment Assad jetted to Moscow for a life of luxurious exile. At bottom, the two sides have competing interests. Sharaa’s government has one goal above all else: consolidate its authority across the state. The SDF and the Kurdish administration in the east were aiming for a decentralized state system, in which the haven they carved out years ago—complete with separate institutions, different demographics and their own de-facto army—was preserved to the maximum extent. Facilitated in part by the Trump administration, Sharaa and Abdi’s representatives tried to square this circle through diplomacy—in March, the two signed an agreement that called for a nationwide ceasefire, guaranteeing the rights of Syria’s minority communities and the integration of the SDF into the Syrian state.
That accord, however, was an extremely general document, with the specifics to be worked out by the end of 2025. Despite follow-on negotiations and several false reports of compromise, Sharaa and Abdi couldn’t come to terms. In the end, Abdi didn’t want to jeopardize everything his side won after years of sacrifice; Sharaa, meanwhile, felt he had the wind at his back given his positive rapport with President Donald Trump as well as the region’s support. Damascus also couldn’t envision a future in which Syria’s natural resources were in the hands of a non-state militia that was effectively created by the United States a decade ago to combat ISIS.
Sharaa eventually ran out of patience and viewed the use of force as his best option. The Trump administration, which earlier issued a statement calling for Damascus to stop its advance, was suddenly thrusted into the role of a mediator as Sharaa’s men traveled further east. Abdi saw the writing on the wall, returned to the negotiating table and effectively signed a deal weighed heavily in Damascus’ favor—Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa will be given back to the Syrian government; all oil facilities, gas fields and borders points will be under Syria’s control; SDF fighters will transition into the Syrian army after vetting; and civil institutions in Kurdish-majority al-Hasakah will be under Damascus’ remit. Although the Kurds will likely have some local autonomy in Hasakah, it’s hard not to look at the arrangement and not come away with a damning conclusion: The Syrian Kurds lost the battle. "The deal is absolutely clear; all state institutions are back,” Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations said.
There will undoubtedly be some back in Washington who believe the Trump administration should have stood up for the Kurds more strongly than it did. Many Kurds on social media have already come around to labeling this entire episode as “the Betrayal,” as if the United States had a moral duty and strategic responsibility to bail them out. In the past, perhaps Washington would have done so; after all, on several occasions, the U.S. Air Force bombed pro-Assad militias who were attempting to cross into Kurdish-held territory.
But to think Trump, the same man who lifted U.S. sanctions against the Syrian economy, hosted al-Sharaa at the White House two months ago and boasted about his leadership abilities, would order strikes on Sharaa’s men was an exercise in delusion. The Kurds grew far too comfortable with the notion that the United States would always support them and apparently failed to take into account that circumstances have changed. Joe Biden is no longer in the White House; Assad is no longer in Damascus; and Trump and Sharaa have identical goals—keep Syria as unified and stable as possible. Anything and anyone that gets in the way of that objective will be steamrolled. The Kurds have learned this the hard way.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune*.*
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
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