North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un speaks as he stands with US President Donald Trump south of the Military Demarcation Line that divides North and South Korea, in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized zone (DMZ) on June 30, 2019.

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Shane Croucher

By Shane Croucher

Senior Editor

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Hours after U.S. President Donald Trump left Washington for Asia on Monday, North Korean state media released pictures of a smiling Kim Jong Un at a ski resort near the Chinese border.

In sunglasses and a leather armchair, cigarette in hand, Kim watched his daughter, Ju Ae, ski downhill without a helmet. But this is a family vacation—officially, a visit to a new tourist resort—that may be cut short.

Trump said Kim might turn up at this week’s APEC summit in Shenzhen, though that was "up to President Xi." By Tuesday, the Kremlin was saying Russian President Vladimir Putin could meet Kim if he came.

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North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un watches his daughter skiing in images released by state media on Tuesday, November 17, 2026.

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But the North Korean resort is a long way from Shenzhen. A researcher at a state-funded Seoul think tank told AFP he saw no sign of summit preparations. The South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun also played down the chances of a Kim-Trump summit.

Still, there are signs that Kim may arrive. If he does, there is one thing both Kim and Trump will want to talk about: nuclear weapons.

Little Kim: Not OK

Back in 2017, Trump had christened Kim "Little Rocket Man" because of the North Korean leader’s advancing nuclear weapons program.

When Trump later explained the nickname to Kim over lunch, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recounted in his memoir, Kim objected to one word: “‘Rocket man,’ OK. ‘Little,’ not OK."

History has sided with Kim on this one. SIPRI, a Stockholm arms control think tank, estimates that Kim has now assembled around 60 nuclear warheads, has fissile material for at least 30 more, and is accelerating production.

Soon, Kim will be a Big Rocket Man, in arsenal if not physical stature.

So Trump should rewrite American policy and go nuclear with Kim—in the arms-control sense, not the fire-and-fury one he threatened against North Korea a few years ago.

On Thursday, he is due to meet Xi and Putin at a trilateral summit that U.S. officials say will focus in large part on nuclear arms control.

Asked what they would discuss, Trump offered a diagnosis that fits Pyongyang at least as well as Beijing or Moscow: "Tough subject because it's very hard for any of us to say we'll get rid of our nukes, right?"

He should act on it. The fiction of complete denuclearization should stop being the stated object of any talks with Kim and become what it realistically is: a long-term goal.

Eyes on the Prize

The prize for now is an interim, verifiable nuclear deal that starves Kim’s arsenal of new fuel, rather than a demand for the one thing he will never willingly give up.

Every year without a deal is costly. In September, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), working from satellite images and North Korean photographs, identified a second uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon that could house up to 28 centrifuge cascades.

No IAEA inspector has worked in the country since April 2009, when its team removed its seals, switched off its cameras, and left. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said in January the North produces enough fissile material for up to 20 weapons a year.

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Officially, Washington offers talks "without any preconditions," but it still names complete denuclearization as the goal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed it with South Korea and Japan on October 30. Almost everyone else has accepted reality.

Kim has said he would talk if America abandoned its pursuit of his disarmament. Seoul still signs such statements, but in July, its unification minister, Chung Dong-young, said South Korea had dropped denuclearization as a precondition for talks.

"Put denuclearization-first at the entrance to talks, and the door won’t open," he said, though the ultimate goal remains a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Victor Cha, a former Bush White House official long counted among the hawks, now argues for a "cold peace" that sets disarmament aside for now.

Even Rubio, once one of the Senate’s fiercest critics of Pyongyang, said on November 13 that Kim is not an expansionist and simply wants his regime to survive. He contrasted North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons with what Iran would seek to do with them.

A smaller deal would not require Kim to hand over a single warhead, a demand that would kill any serious effort before it could even begin.

Its core would be a freeze on fissile-material production, verified by inspectors returning to Yongbyon and entering Kangson for the first time. Plus, there would be a declaration of every other site, with inspectors entitled to test it.

Around that would sit a moratorium on long-range missile launches, a formal ban on nuclear tests, which would largely lock in a pause that has held since 2017, and hotlines to cut the risk of war by accident.

Kim would get limited, reversible sanctions relief. That is the first rung of the freeze-reduce-dismantle ladder Lee has pressed Trump to climb.

Trump has been here before. In Hanoi in 2019, Kim offered to dismantle Yongbyon’s nuclear plants in return for relief from the economic sanctions in five of the 11 U.N. resolutions against him, which are the ones that bite hardest

The president, who said that amounted to lifting all the sanctions, walked out and pointed to nuclear sites beyond Yongbyon.

The lesson here is one of precision. Every step taken should carry a specific price, incentivizing the next, and deepening transparency. Washington should never pay for a sanctions-lifting deal that stops at the sites it already knows much about.

Vindicating North Korean Nukes

But there are serious risks to such a strategy.

Ahn Ho-young, a former South Korean ambassador to Washington, argued in March that a pivot to arms control would convince Kim his "nuclear ambitions have been vindicated."

Pyongyang would demand sanctions relief and a weaker alliance, he warned, and pour the proceeds into its forces.

Michiru Nishida, a former Japanese diplomat now at Nagasaki University, argues that Kim will not agree to anything merely because Washington downgrades its goal.

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Then there’s the small matter of Iran. Rubio drew his distinction while defending a U.S.-Israeli war whose aim, he said, was to stop Tehran ever developing a nuclear weapon. Accepting and rewarding Kim’s arsenal signals to aspiring nuclear powers: build faster.

These are terms to negotiate, though, not reasons to stay away and ignore the material realities. Acknowledging an arsenal is not synonymous with blessing it.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty would still recognize only five nuclear-weapon states, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 would still require North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons "in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner."

Nishida’s own solution—championing denuclearization in public forums while agreeing to disagree at the bargaining table—isn’t far from what’s proposed here.

And because its core is the fissile freeze rather than the missile moratorium, the deal benefits Seoul, which is already well within range of Kim’s short-range missiles, and not just San Francisco.

Relief should be partial, reversible, and paid only for verified steps.

People watch a television screen showing a news broadcast with file footage of a North Korean missile test, at a train station in Seoul on August 20, 2026.

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The alliance should stay off the table, but, here, Trump is his own weakest link. In August, he cut the allies’ Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise from 11 days to five, citing in part his rapport with Kim, and has yet to get anything for it. Maybe Kim will repay the debt now.

As for Iran, Pyongyang already showed long ago that a bomb makes a regime far costlier to attack. There’s no new lesson to be learned. In fact, an inspected freeze, rather than an arsenal that keeps growing undeterred, adds some important caveats to the lesson.

If Pyongyang simply will not let inspectors into Yongbyon and Kangson, or names the end of the U.S.-South Korean alliance as its price, then there is no deal worth having, and Trump should walk away rather than pay for another photo opportunity.

But if Kim signals that he could accept a freeze that verifiably covers its fissile-material production, then each year it holds could keep enough material for 10 to 20 more bombs, on Lee’s estimate, from ever being made. That’s a concrete and desirable achievement.

Kim never minded "Rocket Man." It was "little" he objected to. The point of going nuclear now is to keep his arsenal as close to that word as diplomacy still allows.

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