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TACO Tuesday or tactical genius? Either way, five weeks into the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, the fighting has stopped—for now.
Both sides have agreed to a two-week ceasefire to make space for talks on a broader deal.
The agreement followed a dramatic threat from President Donald Trump: if Iran did not fully reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz by his Tuesday-night deadline, then he would bring its civilization to an end.
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Fortunately, not least for Iranians, that didn't happen. Pakistan instead helped broker a temporary ceasefire, and Iran said it would allow safe passage through the strait for its duration.
Trump, not for the first time, claimed complete and total victory, casting the outcome as proof that his brinkmanship worked. Iran did the same, presenting itself as the power that stood up to the U.S. and held the "Axis of Resistance" together.
Who blinked first, and with how many eyes, is up for discussion. But the gap between the two sides remains wide. Iran has now submitted a 10-point counterproposal after rejecting Trump’s 15-point plan. The differences are stark, and the grim possibility of an explosive end to the fortnight is real.
Several versions of the Iranian plan are circulating, but one of the most detailed was published by Fars, the semiofficial news agency linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
On Truth Social late Tuesday, Trump called the proposal "a workable basis on which to negotiate," adding that "almost all of the various points of past contention have been agreed." In-person talks between U.S. and Iranian negotiators—the first since the war began—are scheduled for Friday in Islamabad.
In this edition of Newsweek’s Dissected, we slice into each point of Iran’s peace plan as relayed by Fars.
1) 'A complete halt to any aggression against Iran and its allied resistance groups'
Tehran, Iran wants a permanent end to attacks, not just a temporary truce. Trump also wants the fighting to stop, in no small part because rising gas prices are intensifying political pressure at home ahead of what are shaping up to be a punishing set of midterms for his Republican Party.
But Iran goes further: it wants protection not only for itself, but also for its network of proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, who are agents of chaos and violence in the Middle East to the benefit of the Iranian regime.
That is a nonstarter for the U.S. and Israel, whose core war aims include curbing Iranian support for those militant groups. Israel has already said the ceasefire does not apply to Lebanon, where it is still striking Hezbollah.
A lasting halt to hostilities would require buy-in from multiple unpredictable militant groups, restraint from an Israel that often acts preemptively, and a credible enforcement mechanism. Good luck with that.
2) 'Withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the region, prohibition of any attacks on Iran from military bases, and refraining from adopting combat formations'
This is Iran’s "Yankee go home" clause. The U.S. has roughly 50,000 troops in the Middle East, reinforced by thousands of paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division.
Gulf allies, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE rely on U.S. bases for security. But that has been a blessing and a curse in this war. These bases have become both shields against, and targets of, Iranian attacks.
A sudden U.S. withdrawal is politically implausible for Gulf states, which have deepened defense, economic, and diplomatic ties with Washington in recent years. The American military presence remains a central check on Iranian power, which Gulf states deeply distrust.
Washington simply won’t accept it. U.S. bases in the Middle East matter not only regionally, but also as part of its wider posture toward China and the Indo-Pacific. They are vital to American strategic interests.
Oil might be in short supply right now. But wishful thinking is clearly abundant.
3) 'Limited daily passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz for two weeks, under a 'safe passage protocol' supervised and regulated by Iran'
The Strait of Hormuz normally carries about a fifth of the world’s oil. After choking it off, Iran is now offering a temporary reopening, on its own terms and under its own supervision. The two-week window mirrors the ceasefire. It is effectively a trial arrangement while wider negotiations continue.
Trump has since said "America will be helping with the traffic buildup in the Strait of Hormuz," suggesting any Iranian supervision would in practice be itself supervised by U.S. power.
Iran had already been trying to formalize its control over the strait before the ceasefire, with analysts describing a "toll booth" model that could charge ships up to $2 million per transit, according to Gulf Business.
Any reopening will calm markets. But a partial reopening under Iranian rules—where Tehran, Iran decides how many ships pass, which ships pass, and at what price—would reward it for having closed the strait in the first place.
The U.S. and allies view freedom of navigation as non-negotiable. But Iran will seek to use, as it has done so far, its ability to wreak havoc in the strait as leverage to squeeze out any concessions it can. It won’t give that up easily, if at all.
4) 'Removal of all primary, secondary, and United Nations sanctions'
This is Iran’s grand prize. It wants all sanctions lifted: U.S. trade restrictions, penalties on third countries, and U.N. measures.
But removing everything up front would strip Washington of much of its leverage. Previous deals phased in relief and kept "snapback" provisions in place to punish non-compliance. Will Iran agree to the same again?
Some sanctions are embedded in U.S. law and require congressional action to lift fully, raising political roadblocks with Iran hawks in the House and Senate. U.N. sanctions need Security Council approval, requiring buy-in from all permanent members.
From Tehran’s perspective, this is justice: its economy was strangled and its territory bombed. From the perspective of Iran hawks in Washington, it looks like capitulation, giving major financial relief in exchange for promises they do not trust.
This is likely to be the central bargaining fight. Sanctions are Iran’s deepest pain point and one of Washington’s strongest non-military tools.
5) 'Compensation for Iran's damages through the creation of an investment and financial fund'
War is expensive, and Iran wants help paying for the damage.
Rather than demand formal reparations, Tehran, Iran proposes an investment fund for reconstruction. That framing is more diplomatic, but the underlying aim is the same: external financing for recovery.
Iran envisages the fund being financed partly through Hormuz transit fees, potentially shared with Oman, rather than through direct U.S. payments.
There is precedent for war-related compensation, but not much that helps Iran here. After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was forced to compensate Kuwait through a U.N. mechanism funded by Iraqi oil revenue, a process that lasted decades.
The U.S. has not paid war reparations in modern history. Iran’s fund proposal looks like an attempt to avoid that language while still securing material support. Gulf states, outside donors, or shipping revenues could in theory contribute.
That would still be a hard sell. Shipping firms and major importers such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea would not welcome a new cost layered onto Hormuz traffic, though if the alternative is a closed strait and $115+ oil, some may accept the trade-off.
Nor would Washington want to endorse any arrangement that lets Iran profit from first closing, then reopening, a vital global shipping lane.
A more-realistic compromise may be indirect: Reconstruction financed in effect through sanctions relief, rather than through an explicit compensation mechanism.
Iran's ideal scenario is simple: get paid and avoid looking like it lost.
6) 'Iran's commitment not to develop nuclear weapons'
Iran is promising what it says it always promised, namely that it will not build a nuclear bomb, in line with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The problem is credibility. Tehran’s ambiguous and, at times, covert actions have made that assurance impossible for the U.S. to accept at face value.
A fatwa by the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is often cited as a ban on nuclear weapons, though analysts have noted it is clearer on use than on production, another sleight of hand by Tehran, Iran.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said Iran was not in a position to make a bomb. But the country’s enrichment record still alarms its critics. And Iranian state media's bombastic fantasies of nuclear annihilation don't help Tehran's cause.
After the 2021 bombing of Natanz Nuclear Facility, which Iran blamed on Israel, Tehran, Iran increased enrichment from the 3.67-percent limit under the old nuclear deal to nearly 60 percent purity. That is short of weapons-grade, around 90 percent, but far beyond what is needed for civilian nuclear energy, and brings a bomb closer to reality.
Iran has also restricted IAEA access in recent years and abandoned some monitoring arrangements after Trump withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 deal.
A nonproliferation pledge without inspections is only a statement of intent. The 2015 accord paired Iran’s commitment with intrusive monitoring and clear limits. This proposal offers the promise, but not yet the verification.
And when there is no trust, there must be verification.
7) 'Recognition by the United States of Iran's right to enrich uranium, and negotiations over enrichment levels'
This may be Iran’s most-consequential demand. It directly collides with the U.S. and Israeli position that Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium on its own soil.
Trump has repeatedly said the Iranians will not be permitted to enrich domestically. Israel shares that goal, arguing that any enrichment capability leaves open a path to a bomb.
For Iran, however, enrichment is about sovereignty as much as science. Tehran, Iran frames it as an "inalienable right" under the NPT.
The 2015 nuclear deal accepted limited enrichment—capped at 3.67 percent and subject to strict monitoring—creating a precedent for compromise. That is what makes this demand both difficult and negotiable.
Recognition of a tightly constrained enrichment program could give Iran a face-saving win while allowing Washington to argue it imposed stricter safeguards than before.
After all the destruction and political investment, the two sides could end up circling back toward something close to the agreement Trump abandoned in 2018.
The challenge will be presentation as much as substance. Tehran, Iran will call it vindication of its nuclear rights. Washington will call it a toughly enforced restriction. Both will claim they won.
But reaching that point would require a significant shift in Washington and Tel Aviv’s positions. Trump is a flexible dealmaker when he wants to be. Is Benjamin Netanyahu?
8) 'Iran's agreement to negotiate bilateral and multilateral peace treaties with regional countries in line with its interests'
On its face, this is one of the more-constructive points. Iran is signaling that it is open to formal detente with its Gulf neighbors, potentially building on the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in 2023.
But the qualifier matters: "in line with its interests." That leaves Tehran, Iran ample room to reject any deal it believes weakens its regional influence.
The biggest omission is Israel. Iran does not recognize it and almost certainly does not include it among the "regional countries" with which it is prepared to make peace. Yet a durable regional settlement is hard to imagine without some form of lasting de-escalation between those two states.
Trust is another obstacle. Iran has recently launched missiles at Gulf states, making its new peace language harder to sell. If Tehran, Iran is serious about regional agreements, that is significant. But its neighbors will want proof this is not simply a pause to regroup.
9) 'Extension of non-aggression commitments to all aggressors against all resistance groups'
Point 9 is really Point 1 in a sharper form: Iran wants non-aggression guarantees not just for itself, but for its entire proxy network, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias.
Tehran, Iran has usually kept its regional proxy activities separate from nuclear diplomacy and has long treated them as non-negotiable. It also denies direct command over these groups, describing its support as defensive.
That makes verification exceptionally difficult. Monitoring militia finance, arms flows, and command structures is far harder than monitoring centrifuges.
It is also an extraordinarily hard sell. Israel sees freedom to strike Hezbollah as central to its security. Saudi Arabia has spent years fighting the Houthis. From their perspective, this demand would formalize the protection of armed groups they regard as threats.
If there is any compromise here, it is likely to come through narrower, theater-specific arrangements rather than a blanket guarantee covering every Iran-aligned militia.
10) 'Termination of all resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, and approval of all commitments in an official UN resolution'
Iran wants the past shredded and the future gift-wrapped. It seeks two things here: the erasure of past censure and the international legal blessing of any new deal.
Ending prior IAEA and U.N. Security Council resolutions would wipe away years of nuclear-related pressure. A new Security Council resolution would also give Tehran, Iran protection against another unilateral U.S. withdrawal by embedding the agreement in international law.
For the IAEA, however, that would mean closing the file on unresolved issues, including uranium traces found at undeclared sites. That cannot simply be wished away without damaging the agency’s credibility.
Iran has often portrayed the IAEA as a tool of the West. But forcing the watchdog to drop outstanding questions without adequate transparency would be a major concession by the international system, not a technical cleanup.
Any compromise here will depend on whether Iran provides enough access and disclosure to justify closing the book. Its recent record does not inspire confidence.
For Tehran, Iran, this point is about legitimacy as much as legality: ending its status as a nuclear outlier and securing a U.N.-endorsed settlement. For Washington, any such resolution would have to contain enforceable terms, not just diplomatic ceremony.
Iran’s Opening Hand
Iran's 10 points are a maximalist opening hand, designed to be bargained down, not accepted wholesale.
The core goals are clear: security guarantees, sanctions relief, and international legitimacy. Other demands—Hormuz tolls, sweeping proxy protections, immediate sanctions removal—look more like negotiating chips.
The ceasefire itself suggests both sides blinked. Iran reopened Hormuz, at least temporarily; the U.S. halted its bombardment.
Whether the Islamabad talks produce a real deal or simply postpone the next round of escalation will depend on whether Washington and Tehran, Iran can separate winning the argument from ending the war.
For now, talking beats bombing.
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