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Lucy Draper

By Lucy Draper

Deputy News Editor

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Fallen soldiers, wasted resources, and tarnished reputation. These are some of the costs of the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) risky military intervention in Yemen. Having worked so hard and invested so much over the past decade to create a positive image for itself and effectively become a role model in the region, is the UAE's war in a poor and conflict-ridden country such as Yemen a harmful distraction or a necessary pursuit? The UAE's leaders believe it's the latter. Here is why.

The UAE's decision to intervene in Yemen is a head-scratcher. Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE does not share a border with Yemen. Therefore, any security threat posed by pro-Iran Houthi rebels in Yemen to the UAE is not direct. While some Houthi surface-to-surface missiles can reach UAE territory, the military danger is neither immediate nor lethal (those missiles are not accurate or reliable, and the UAE fields some of the most powerful missile defenses in the world). The UAE also does not share Saudi Arabia's other incentives for getting involved in Yemen: asserting leadership of the Arab world and control of the Gulf Cooperation Council, of which it is a member. Such goals are unrealistic for the UAE.

But it is on overall threat assessment where the two Sunni Arab Gulf powerhouses meet. The UAE and Saudi Arabia's fear of Yemen turning into another Iranian outpost is mutual. There is acceptance in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh that Iran does not see Yemen as a priority and its assistance to the Houthis has been modest, but the Emirati and Saudi concern is about the future. Unchecked, Iran could use Yemen to challenge Saudi national security. The Houthis in Yemen could be the next Hezbollah in Lebanon, a scenario which Saudi Arabia and the UAE would much prefer to avoid. So the war is preventive par excellence, with a goal of denying Iran an opportunity to spread its destabilizing influence in another Arab capital like it did in Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut.

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Another important but less known factor that is driving the UAE to enter Yemen is the strategic decision to stick with Saudi Arabia in a moment of need, and to forge a closer bond between the two nations. Siding with Saudi Arabia was not an option, Abu Dhabi says. Also, at a time when security ties with the United States—at least until President Barack Obama leaves office—and the Europeans are uncertain and less than reliable, respectively, a stronger security partnership with a large, wealthy, and well-armed neighboring country such as Saudi Arabia could add to the UAE's strategic depth.

These benefits notwithstanding, reaping them will depend on what happens on the Yemeni battlefield. The conflict has already cost the UAE, a small country of a little less than 1.5 million citizens, a substantial amount of blood and treasure (at least 54 soldiers have died), and with every picture posted by the Houthis and their allies on social media and pro-Iran channels of a dead Yemeni child due to Saudi and Emirati air strikes, the UAE's international reputation takes a big hit. Saudi Arabia is providing aid to Yemeni civilians, but the humanitarian situation in the country continues to be disastrous. The world is watching, and the United States' patience, in particular, is running low. Washington also is seriously concerned that escalation of the conflict and further deterioration in socioeconomic conditions breed radicalization and help Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's cause and fortunes.

But the UAE leadership is focused on not getting dragged into a war of attrition in Yemen. Yemen will not be their Vietnam, they believe. The military effort is not open-ended, instead it is designed to achieve specific and attainable objectives including putting a dent in the Houthis' military capabilities and strengthening the bargaining hand of President Hadi's forces, both of which could ultimately help bring about a negotiated settlement. It is the same logic that is being pursued by rebel-supporting nations in Syria, though the UAE hopes that it will produce a different outcome (the war in Syria keeps getting worse and there is no end in sight). That, however, will depend in many ways on what Iran decides to do in Yemen.

Iran could choose to compromise and show its Arab Gulf neighbors and the world that it is not a regional destabilizer. But that doesn't seem very likely, at least for now. Iran is conducting its Yemen operation on the cheap, therefore it has very little to lose and little incentive to de-escalate. Iran can fight to the last Yemeni, like it typically does with its Syrian, Iraqi, Lebanese, and Palestinian surrogates and not have to worry about financial or military burdens. One could even say that Iran has already won in Yemen, having entangled and bled its main Gulf adversaries in a quagmire in which it is not directly involved. Indeed, Tehran believes that Riyadh has fallen into the Yemeni trap. It may be a pyrrhic Iranian victory of course given the brokenness of Yemen, but it is quite an accomplishment nonetheless in the Saudi-Iranian regional power struggle.

There is much to gain in the UAE's decision to use military force in Yemen, and betting on arguably the most professional Arab military force to pull this off with the fewest costs is not entirely unreasonable, but there is arguably more to lose. No matter how the country's leadership frames its intervention, Yemen looks like a war of choice. For now, the Emirati people have rallied around the flag and unity in the country seems remarkably strong. Few Emiratis are questioning their leaders' decision making or conduct of the war. In fact, more people, it seems, want to join the military and serve in Yemen.

Still, a lot can quickly change if more Emirati soldiers return home in body bags. The more mourning the country does the more pressure on its leaders to conduct a comprehensive strategic review of the war. Should the moment to revisit its choice come, Abu Dhabi would have to do it though in a way that doesn't alienate a very valuable Saudi friend that seems to be more firmly committed to the military campaign in Yemen. That may turn out to be the UAE's ultimate challenge. Getting in was relatively easy, getting out will be anything but.

Bilal Y. Saab is a Senior Fellow in the Middle East Peace and Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.

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